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This paper studies the famous Feldstein and Horioka finding, which is a high correla-
tion between long period averages of savings rates and investment rates across countries. 
We first confirm the Feldstein-Horioka finding with a more recent data set, and then 
show that a calibrated complete markets model generates a cross-section savings-
investment correlation close to zero. Thus, the cross-section Feldstein-Horioka finding is 
a puzzle to the complete markets model and further research is needed to account for this 
puzzle.  
We next explore roles of financial frictions in accounting for the cross-section Feld-
stein-Horioka puzzle. The most popular incomplete markets model, the bond model with 
natural borrowing constraints, cannot account for the cross-section Feldstein-Horioka 
puzzle. We then propose the bond model with enforcement constraints in which uncon-
tingent debt contracts are enforced by the threat of permanent exclusion from the mar-
kets. This model generates endogenous borrowing constraints, which capture the incen-
tives of countries to repay their debts instead of their abilities to repay under natural bor-
rowing constraints, and accounts for the cross-section Feldstein-Horioka puzzle. 
                                                
* We would like to thank Patrick Kehoe, Timothy Kehoe, Ellen McGrattan, Cristina Arellano, Fabrizio Perri, 
V.V. Chari and Narayana Kocherlakota for helpful comments and suggestions. All errors remain our own.  




The savings-investment puzzle is one of the most important regularities in interna-
tional finance, which originally identified by Feldstein and Horioka (1980). Feldstein and 
Horioka find that a cross-country1 regression of average investment rates on average sav-
ings rates results in a regression coefficient close to one. They argue that this regression 
coefficient should be close to zero in a frictionless open economy world and suggest that 
this large regression coefficient indicates a high degree of financial frictions in the world 
economy. Their finding and claims about substantial financial frictions in international 
financial markets raise a huge debate in the literature. The profession has responded to 
the Feldstein-Horioka finding from two different approaches.  
First, empirical research attempts to refute the finding either by studying different 
data samples and periods, by adding other variables to the original OLS regression, or by 
using different estimation methods. However, it turns out that the high correlation be-
tween savings and investment is remarkably robust in both OECD and non-OECD coun-
tries, though the FH coefficient has tended to decline in recent years.2 In this paper, we 
confirm the Feldstein-Horioka finding with a more recent data set with a sample of 57 
countries over the period from 1960 to 2000. 
Second, theoretical research tries to refute the claims that the regression coefficient 
on savings is close to zero in a frictionless world, and thus the Feldstein-Horioka finding 
provides no information about financial frictions. However, most quantitative studies in 
the literature have focused on a variant of the original finding, that is, the high time-series 
correlation between savings and investment rates at business cycle frequencies within 
nations,3 instead of the cross-section Feldstein-Horioka finding. Baxter and Crucini 
(1993) and Finn (1990) show that the high time-series correlation between savings and 
investment rates at business cycle frequencies can arise naturally in a quantitative com-
plete markets model (frictionless capital markets with a complete set of assets). Mendoza 
(1991) show that the most popular incomplete markets model, the bond model in which 
                                                
1 Data sample: 16 OECD countries (Austria, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland, Germany, 
Greece, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Netherlands, New Zealand, Sweden, United Kingdom, and United States) 
from 1960 to 1974 
2 Details see Coakley, Kulasi and Smith (1998). 
3 Details see Tesar (1991). 
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countries can only trade state-uncontingent bonds, can also quantitative produce the high 
correlation between savings and investment in time series. Thus, the high time-series cor-
relation offers no insight about financial frictions. 
Motivated by the time-series research, we first investigate the cross-section regression 
coefficient on savings using a theoretical model with complete markets. Given our focus, 
we need to depart from the standard two-country setup and develop a framework with a 
large number of countries. For the sake of tractability, we use a continuum of small open 
economies with production. The uncertainty in the model arises from idiosyncratic fluc-
tuations in country-specific total factor productivities (TFP). In our quantitative work, we 
capture the rich characteristics of (total factor) productivity processes for 57 countries in 
the sample with a regime switching process.  
In contrast to results from time-series studies, the complete markets model generates 
a regression coefficient on savings close to zero, which confirms the claim made by Feld-
stein and Horioka. The key to this result is that with complete markets, investment de-
pends on changes in TFP shocks, while savings depends on levels of TFP shocks. Con-
sider an extreme case of a random walk process, in which changes in shocks are inde-
pendent of levels of shocks. We would expect no correlation between savings and in-
vestment rates in cross section. With highly persistent TFP shocks calibrated to the data, 
the cross-section correlation between savings and investment rates is close to zero.  
Thus, we are left with a puzzle: what kinds of financial frictions can account for the 
Feldstein-Horioka puzzle? We first study the most popular incomplete markets model in 
the literature: the bond with natural borrowing constraints4 model. In this model, coun-
tries can only trade state-uncontingent bonds instead of a complete set of state-contingent 
assets. With natural borrowing constraints, countries cannot borrow more than what they 
can repay without incurring non-positive consumption. The implicit assumption behind 
the natural borrowing constraints is existence of complete enforcement in the interna-
tional financial markets: countries repay their debt no matter how low their utilities have 
to go, so long as it is physically feasible for them to do so.  
The bond with natural borrowing constraints model is remarkably unsuccessful in ac-
counting for the cross-section Feldstein-Horioka puzzle. The key reason is that the natu-
                                                
4  As in Aiyagari (1994)  
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ral borrowing constraints are so loose that the model allows too much borrowing and 
lending relative to what we observed in the data. Countries are able to shift resources 
across periods according to their investment needs, though they cannot insure against the 
idiosyncratic uncertainty within a period. Thus, the bond with natural borrowing con-
straints model generates a very low FH coefficient relative to the one in the data.  
The implicit assumption of complete enforcement in the bond with natural borrowing 
constraints model is hard to justify given the weak enforcement mechanism on sovereign 
debts in the international financial markets. Thus, we relax this assumption and consider 
the bond with enforcement constraints model. In this model, countries are still limited to 
trading state-uncontingent bonds, but there is only limited enforcement, under which in-
ternational debt contracts are enforced by the threat of exclusion from international finan-
cial markets. That is, at every period, countries cannot borrow more than what they have 
incentives to repay rather than defaulting and entering financial autarky for any possible 
realization of shock during the following period.  
The bond with enforcement constraints model produces a regression coefficient close 
to the one observed in the data, and thus can account for the cross-section Feldstein-
Horioka puzzle. Compared with the (implicit) infinite default penalty under natural bor-
rowing constraints, the (explicit) default penalty of financial autarky under the enforce-
ment constraints is less severe. As a result, the enforcement constraints generate much 
tighter borrowing constraints, which endogenously respond to the larger incentives of 
countries to default under lower default penalty. Quantitatively, the bond with enforce-
ment constraints model generates capital flows, measured by the current account-over-
GDP ratios, very close to what we observe in the data. Thus, this model generates a posi-
tive regression coefficient close to the data.  
This paper is closely related to the literature on sustainability of sovereign debts. One 
approach of determining the viability of sovereign debt is by looking at the ability of 
countries to repay, that is, whether countries are able to generate sufficient future trade 
surplus (or future income) to repay the debt.5 The bond with natural borrowing con-
straints model studies the ability of countries to repay by focusing on the solvency of 
debts. Another approach is to evaluate sustainability of debt by the willingness of coun-
                                                
5 Detailed discussions see Milesi-Ferretti and Razin (1996). 
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tries to repay. The bond with enforcement constraints model captures the willingness of 
countries to repay by taking into account the incentives of borrowers. That is, countries 
have an implicit option to default on their debts and enter financial autarky if they want 
to. Given this option, at every period, the debt that countries can issue must provide them 
incentives to repay no matter which shock is realized in the following period. This paper 
shows that the willingness of countries to repay, instead of the abilities of countries to 
repay, plays an important role in accounting for international borrowing and lending. 
This paper also borrows from a large literature on limited enforcement.6 The most 
closely related work is Zhang (1997), which studies the limited enforcement friction with 
incomplete markets for a pure exchange economy with 2-type agents. The bond with en-
forcement constraints model studied in this paper builds on Zhang (1997) and extends the 
analysis to the environment with production economies and a continuum of agents.  
The models studied in this paper are rich enough to also look at the time-series impli-
cations. In the time-series literature, capital adjustment costs are commonly imposed to 
match the volatility of investment in the data.7 Thus, when looking at the time-series cor-
relation, we also impose capital adjustment costs. We find that all the models, with or 
without financial frictions, generate large time-series correlations between savings and 
investment rates with almost no change in the cross-section regression results. Hence, this 
paper confirms the results in the time-series literature that the large time-series correla-
tion offers no insight about financial frictions, and in fact is the result of highly persistent 
shocks. 
The chapter is organized as follows. Section 2 introduces the original Feldstein-
Horioka puzzle in cross section. Section 3 describes the theoretical model with complete 
markets and quantitative results under this benchmark model. Section 4 describes the 
bond with natural borrowing constraints model. Section 5 presents the bond with en-
forcement constraints model. Section 6 presents implications on the time-series correla-
tion between savings and investment, and Section 7 concludes. 
 
 
                                                
6 Kehoe and Levin (1993), Kocherlakota (1996), Alveraz and Jermann (2000), Kehoe and Perri (2002), and 
etc. 
7 Papers referred to earlier have all imposed capital adjustment costs. 
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2 The Cross-Section Feldstein-Horioka Puzzle 
In Feldstein and Horioka’s seminal paper (1980), they estimate the following equa-










(S / Y )
i
 (1) 
where I  is the gross domestic investment (gross capital formation); Y  is the gross do-
mestic product (GDP); S  is the gross domestic savings8, defined as GDP minus private 
and government consumption; and  i  denotes country indices. For each country  i  and 
each year  t , Feldstein and Horioka first calculate savings and investment rates ( / )itS Y  
and ( / )
it
I Y . Next, they compute period averages of the savings rates and investment 
rates for each country, denoted by ( / )
i
S Y  and ( / )
i
I Y , and run the cross-section regres-
sion of the average investment rates on the average savings rates as specified in Equation 
(1). 
With a sample of 16 OECD countries over the period from 1960 to 1974, they find 
that the regression coefficient on savings rates is 0.89 with a standard error of 0.07. The 
regression result shows that in the long run, the average savings rates and the average in-
vestment rates are highly, positively correlated in cross section. A large body of literature 
following this paper shows that this result is robust to all econometric variation exam-
ined. A survey article by Coakley, Kulasi and Smith (1998) reviews these findings in de-
tails. 
Feldstein and Horioka published their original paper in 1980, over 25 years ago. Due 
to limited data availability at that time, they were only able to consider a small sample of 
countries. Further, during the past 20 years, the world has witnessed a dramatic increase 
in international capital flows across countries. To explore whether the Feldstein-Horioka 
finding is robust to a more recent data set, we run the same regression with a larger sam-
ple (57 countries)9 and a longer time period (1960-2000). We find that the regression co-
efficient is 0.46 with a standard error of 0.07 (see Figure 1). Thus, we still observe the 
                                                
8 Tesar (1991) shows that the result is robust if gross national savings is used instead of gross domestic 
savings.  
9 See Appendix 1. 
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positive cross-section correlation between savings rates and investment rates in the long 
run, though the regression coefficient is much lower than the original estimate made by 
Feldstein and Horioka. We also experiment with different sub-periods and subgroups of 
countries to confirm that the finding of the positive regression coefficient is robust.10 Ta-
ble 1 shows that the regression coefficient is positive (around 0.50) and significantly dif-
ferent from zero, regardless of countries and periods sampled. 
These results confirm that the Feldstein-Horioka finding is a pervasive regularity in 
the data. In a world with closed economies, where domestic investment must be fully fi-
nanced by domestic savings in each period, the cross-section correlation is one. Feldstein 
and Horioka argued that in a world with complete markets, which is frictionless, the 
cross-section correlation should be zero. In the following section, we will study the com-
plete markets model to test the above argument in cross section. It turns out that this find-
ing is a puzzle to the complete markets model in cross section and motivates us to explore 
models with financial frictions. 
3 The Complete Markets Model 
In this section, we study the cross-section correlation between savings rates and in-
vestment rates in the complete markets model, where countries can trade a complete set 
of Arrow securities in international financial markets without any financial frictions.  To 
study a large number of countries in a tractable fashion, we consider a production econ-
omy in a continuum of small open economies framework. 
3.1 The Production Technology 
There is a homogeneous good which can be either consumed or invested. The produc-
tion function is the standard Cobb-Douglas given by 1AK L! !" , where A  denotes the 
productivity shock, K  denotes the capital inputs, L  denotes the exogenous labor inputs11 
and !  is the capital share parameter. At the beginning of each period, each country faces 
a productivity shock, which has a deterministic trend component and an idiosyncratic 
                                                
10 To compare with the Feldstein-Horioka result, we take two sub-periods (1960-1974 and 1974-2000) and 
two subgroups of countries (16 OECD countries and the rest of the countries). 
11  Here we assume that labor supply is inelastic and abstract from labor and leisure decisions for the sake 
of simplicity and tractability. 
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shock component. There is no aggregate uncertainty. Specifically, the productivity shock 
is given by (1 )tt a tA g a= + , where ag  is the deterministic trend, which is common across 
countries and constant across periods, and 
t
a  is the country-specific idiosyncratic shock, 
which follows a Markov process with a finite support and a transition matrix ! . We 
normalize all the relevant variables by the labor supply and the deterministic growth rate 





" .12 The production function is simplified to ( )f k ak!= , where small let-
ters denote the variables after normalization. 
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ity of history ta  is generated by the transition matrix as follows: 
 













3.2 The Planner’s Problem 
Countries are indexed by the initial state 0 0 0 0( , , )s a k b=  where 0a  is the initial idio-
syncratic productivity shock, 
0
k  is the initial capital stock and 
0
b  is the initial asset hold-
ing. In each country, a planner, who makes consumption, capital and savings (borrowing) 
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where !  denotes the discount factor and c  denotes consumption. The period utility func-














where !  is the risk aversion parameter. 
The planner maximizes welfare subject to resource constraints 
                                                
12  All the 1t +  variables should be preceded by (1+g). We drop it only for clarity of the model. It is in-
cluded in all computations. 
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and no-Ponzi constraints given by 
1 0( , , )
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t
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where, !  is the capital depreciation parameter; B  is a borrowing limit which is sufficient 
large such that these constraints never bind in equilibrium; 0( , )
t
k a s  denotes the capital 
decision; 1 0( , , )
t
t
b a a s
+
 denotes the Arrow security which delivers one unit of goods for 








) denotes the 
price of such Arrow security. 
3.3 The Complete Markets Equilibrium 
Complete markets equilibrium is a set of prices 1{ ( , )}t tq a a+  and allocations 
0 0 1 0{ ( , ), ( , ), ( , , )}
t t t
t
c a s k a s b a a s
+
 which satisfy the following conditions: 
(1) Allocations solve the planner’s problem given prices; 
(2) Allocations satisfy the resource clearing conditions given by, for any at ,  
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% = 0 .        (4) 
The equilibrium can be characterized using nice properties of complete markets with-
out aggregate uncertainty. First, with perfect risk-sharing in complete markets, consump-
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Second, the Arrow security prices are given by 
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Finally, the Arrow securities for any history can be solved from the difference between 
the discounted sum of the consumption path after that history node and the discounted 
sum of the income flow after that history node. 
3.4 Calibration 
To quantitatively evaluate the cross-section correlation between savings rates and in-
vestment rates, we need to calibrate all the parameters, and more importantly, the world 
productivity process, to the data. In this section, we describe the calibration in detail. 
3.4.1 Calibration of Parameters 
The preference and technology parameters are calibrated as follows and are reported 
in Table 2. The deterministic growth rate 
a
g  is calibrated to match the world average 
TFP growth rate of 1.3 percent.14 For the risk aversion parameter ! , we choose the stan-
dard literature value 2.0.  
All of the other parameters are calibrated to the U.S. data. For the capital depreciation 
rate ! , we take the ratio of the U.S. average capital consumption allowance to the capi-
tal-output ratio, following Stokey and Rebelo (1990). In the data average capital con-
sumption allowance to GDP is 0.107 over the period from 1960 to 2000, and the average 
capital-GDP ratio is around 1.73.15 Thus, the capital depreciate rate !  is 6 percent. The 
discount rate !  is calibrated to match the real capital return of 4 percent. The capital 
share !  is calibrated to match the labor compensation share of 0.67. National Accounts 
Statistics suggest that labor compensation shares of poor countries might be smaller than 
that in the United Sates. However, the labor compensation in the National Accounts fails 
to account for self-employed labor. Gollin (2001) showed that for 31 countries, which 
have enough data to adjust the labor income by including self-employed workers, the la-
bor shares are in the range of 0.6 to 0.85, closer to the labor share in the United States.  
                                                
14 Details see the calibration of the world productivity process. 
15 See Christiano (1988). 
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3.4.2 Calibration of the World Productivity Process 
We first compute the productivity processes for the 57 countries in the sample using 
the standard growth accounting method. Next we analyze the key features of the proc-
esses and estimate one stochastic process to capture the key characteristics of the produc-
tivity processes observed in the data. 
We calibrate the productivity process for each country as follows:  
log log log (1 )log
it it it it
A Y K L= ! ! !" " ,                               (8) 
where 
it
Y  is the real GDP; 
it
L  is total employment and 
it
K  is the total capital stock con-
structed from gross investment data.16 Next we normalize the productivity processes by 
the average growth rate of 1.3 percent. To make the productivity processes comparable 
across countries, we use the nominal exchange rates of year 1995 (national currency per 
US$) to adjust levels of the productivity processes.17 The normalized productivity proc-
esses are presented in Figure 2. 
From Figure 2, we observe three key features in the calibrated productivity processes, 
motivating our choice of the stochastic process. First, the range of the productivity proc-
esses is more than 17 times the mean of the standard deviations of each country (see Fig-
ure 3). Second, poor countries are more volatile than rich countries on average (see Fig-
ure 4). Third, the processes for some countries have different characteristics during dif-
ferent sub-periods (see Figure 5). 
The above features of the TFP processes motivate our choice of regime-switching 
process. There are three regimes.18 Conditional on being in regime 1,2,3i
t
! = , we as-
sume that TFP shocks follow an autoregressive process given by 
1(1 )i i i i
t t t t
i i i
t t t
a aµ ! ! " #$% % % %= $ + + ,                                    (9) 
                                                
16 For the detailed data source, refer to appendix 1. 
17 Result is unchanged if using nominal exchange rate in any other year since it is just a scalar and doesn’t 
change the productivity process at all. Since all the real data are in 1995 price, we choose 1995 nominal 
exchange rate. 
18 The justification for the three-regime specification is as follows. The three-regime specification signifi-
cantly improves the goodness of fit over the two-regime, while the four-regime specification barely im-





a  denotes the idiosyncratic TFP shock of country i at period t , i
t
!  is i.i.d. and 
drawn from a standard normal distribution (0,1)N , and i
t
!  denotes the regime that coun-
try i  is in at period t . The probability of switching from one regime to another is given 
by the transition matrix ! .  
We use maximum likelihood method to estimate the unknown parameters: 
1,2,3{{ , , } , }µ ! "# # # #=$ = % . The method we use is an extension of that in Hamilton 
(1991) for one time series to panel data series. The Expectation-Maximization (EM)19 
principle is used to compute the solutions. The detailed algorithm is described in Appen-
dix 2.  
In Table 3, we report the maximum likelihood estimates for the above parameters 
along with the standard errors. For convenience, the three regimes will be referred to as 
the low, middle, and high regimes, according to the degree of volatility. From the transi-
tion matrix estimated, if at a given time period one country is in a given regime, it will 
most likely stay in that regime, but there is a positive probability that it may switch to an-
other regime. We use the Tauchen (1986) method to discretize the AR1 process with re-
gime change in the numerical analysis. 
3.5 Results 
In this section we simulate the complete markets model and report the results. In the 
empirical work, we analyze annual data on 57 countries, which include a mix of devel-
oped and developing countries, over 41 periods from 1960 to 2000. To be consistent with 
the data sample of 57 countries over 41 periods, we perform the regression exercise on 
model simulations of the same number of countries and of the same time periods as in the 
data. More specifically, we simulate 57 time series of the TFP processes of 1000 periods 
in each simulation. For each county, given the initial TFP shock 
0




20 and we use the optimal 
0
k  for 
0
a  specified in (7). We then compute all the vari-
ables according to the decision rules. After a long period, the world economy is in invari-
                                                
19 Dempster, Laird, and Rubin (1977) 
20 The invariant distribution over debts in the complete markets model is not unique and depends on the 
initial distribution over debts. We are interested in the invariant distribution of debts generated from an 
initial distribution of a continuum of closed economies.  
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ant distribution. Given the shock processes and capital stock and bonds holding at the be-
ginning of the last 41 periods, we compute the equilibrium solutions and the average sav-
ings rates and the average investment rates for 57 series. We then run the same regression 
as we did for the data to compute the coefficient on savings, referred as the FH coeffi-
cient. We repeat the above simulation procedure 1000 times. In Table 4, we report the 
mean statistics across 1000 simulations.  
The mean of the FH coefficients over 1000 simulations is 0.001 and the standard de-
viation of mean is 0.02. Thus, the cross-section correlation between savings and invest-
ment rates is quantitatively zero in the complete markets model. To understand the result, 
let’s first look at the investment and savings decisions in complete markets. Investment 
depends on the change of shocks: if the shock today is higher than the shock yesterday, 
countries will increase investment to build up the higher capital stock desired, while if the 
shock today is lower than the shock yesterday, countries will decrease the capital stock, 
meaning that investment level will be low. On the other hand, savings depends on the 
level of shocks. When the level of shock is low, savings is low and may even be negative. 
The converse is also true. 
For the sake of the intuition, assume that all economies in the world start with the 
same initial condition, and thus have the same consumption path. Under the invariant dis-
tribution, countries with shocks above the mean level will have high average savings 
rates, and countries with shocks below the mean level will have low average savings 
rates. However, independent of whether a country is rich or poor, if it has a higher shock 
in the period following the current period, it will invest more and vice versa. Consider the 
extreme case of random walk, in which the level of the shock is independent of the 
change in the shock. We would expect zero correlation in cross section. In the data, the 
shocks are very persistent (close to random walk) and this is why savings rates and in-
vestment rates have zero cross-section correlation.21 
This result is in stark contrast with the findings in the existing studies on the high 
time-series correlation between savings and investment rates. In those studies, the posi-
tive time-series correlation can naturally arise in a quantitative complete markets model 
                                                
21 If the shock process becomes less persistent than the one we estimate here, the cross-section regression 
coefficient turns negative instead of positive because of the stronger mean reversion.  
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as endogenous responses of savings and investment to persistent TFP shocks. However, 
this chapter shows that the complete markets model does generate a cross-section regres-
sion coefficient close to zero. Thus, the Feldstein-Horioka finding is a puzzle to models 
in the absence of financial frictions.  
Having confirmed the Feldstein-Horioka claim that average investment rates and av-
erage savings rates should display no correlation across countries in a frictionless world, 
we are left with a puzzle: What kinds of financial frictions can account for the Feldstein-
Horioka puzzle? In Section 4, we will address the above question. 
4 The Bond with Natural Borrowing Constraints Model 
To account for the cross-section Feldstein-Horioka puzzle, we deviate from the com-
plete markets model to explore incomplete markets models. In this section, we will study 
the most extensive-used incomplete markets model in the literature, the bond model. The 
model environment is the same as the complete markets model, except that assets traded 
are restricted to state-uncontingent bonds instead of a full set of state-contingent Arrow 
securities. 
4.1 The Model 
In a world with a continuum of small open economies without aggregate uncertainty, 
interest rates R  are constant over time. Given the interest rate R , the planner in each 
country s
0
 chooses sequences of consumption {c(at , s
0
)} , bonds {b(at , s
0
)}  and capital 
stocks {k(at , s
0
)}  to maximize the welfare given by (2), subject to resource constraints 
given by, 
 1 1 10 0 0 0 0 0( , ) ( , ) (1 ) ( , ) ( , ) ( , ) ( , )
t t t t t t
t




+ # # + = + , (10) 
and natural borrowing constraints given by 
 0 0ˆ( , ) ( , ( , ))
t t
tb a s B a k a s! . (11) 
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The natural borrowing constraints 0ˆ ( , ( , ))
t
t
B a k a s  specify how much a country with the 
TFP shock 
t
a  and the capital decision 0( , )
t
k a s  can borrow such that, no matter which 
shock is realized in the next period, this country can repay its debt without incurring non-
positive consumption.  
The idea behind the natural borrowing constraint is to capture abilities of countries to 
repay as a criterion for sustainability of sovereign debts, that is, the viability of sovereign 
debts is determined by whether countries are able to generate sufficient future trade sur-
plus (or future income) to repay the debt. The natural borrowing constraints implicitly 
assume complete enforcement in international borrowing and lending, that is, countries 
will repay their debts no matter how low their utilities have to go as long as it is physi-
cally feasible for them to do so. 
An equilibrium in the bond with natural borrowing constraints model consists of the 
world interest rate and a sequence of allocations such that, given the interest rate, the al-
locations solve the planner’s problem in each country and the world resource clearing 
constraints as in (4) are satisfied. 
4.2 Results 
To quantitatively study the FH coefficient generated from the bond with natural bor-
rowing constraints model, we calibrate parameters and the TFP process in the model us-
ing the same method used in Section 3. We focus on the stationary equilibrium, i.e., den-
sity functions over the states are the same over time. The stationary equilibrium can be 




( , , ) max ( | ) ( , , )
1 a a
c






& '$ % % % %= +( )
$* +
, , 
s.t. (1 )c k k b ak Rb!"# #+ $ $ + % + , 
ˆ( , )b B a k! !" . 
To compute the stationary equilibrium, we first guess a world interest rate R . Next, 
we compute the decision rules for each state ( , , )a k b  and calibrate the invariant distribu-
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tion *( , , )a k b! 22 using the iterative method together with decision rules. Finally, we 
compute whether the excess demand of bonds clears under the invariant distribution. If 
not, we update the interest rate until the bond markets are cleared.  
After solving the equilibrium in the bond with natural borrowing constraints model, 
we simulate the model from the invariant distribution. We first simulate the model by 
drawing 57 time series of the same length as the data and compute all the relevant vari-
ables according to the decision rules. Next, we compute the average savings and invest-
ment rates for 57 series and run the Feldstein-Horioka regression. We repeat the above 
simulation procedure 1000 times. In Table 5, we report average statistics over 1000 simu-
lations. The mean of the regression coefficients is 0.06 with the standard deviation of 
mean 0.02. Thus, the bond with natural borrowing constraints model generates an FH co-
efficient much lower than the one in the data, which is 0.46. 
This model fails to produce the observed large FH coefficient because the natural bor-
rowing constraints are quite loose and countries are able to shift huge resources across 
periods. As shown in Figure 6, under natural borrowing constraints, countries are al-
lowed, on average, to borrow up to 7-8 times their current income. In equilibrium, this 
model generates a current-account-over GDP ratio of about 42 percent, in contrast to only 
6 percent in the data. Thus, if sustainability of debts is modeled by abilities of countries 
to repay, the model generates too much international borrowing and lending relative to 
what is observed in the data and cannot account for the cross-section Feldstein-Horioka 
puzzle. In the next section, we will consider sustainability of debts by incentives of coun-
tries to repay in accounting for the cross-section Feldstein-Horioka puzzle. 
5. The Bond with Enforcement Constraints Model 
In this section, we study the bond with enforcement constraints model. In this model, 
countries are still limited to trading uncontingent bonds. However, there is only limited 
enforcement in international borrowing and lending. Contracts are enforced by the threat 
of exclusion from markets. That is, countries have the option to repudiate their debt and 
the punishment they get for doing so is to be excluded from international financial mar-
                                                
22 Details see Appendix 3. 
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kets forever. In contrast to natural borrowing constraints, enforcement constraints aim to 
capture incentives of countries to repay rather than their abilities to repay. The amount 
that a country can borrow must be such that it has incentives to repay rather than default-
ing and entering financial autarky for any possible realization of shock during the follow-
ing period. In equilibrium, countries do not default, because the amount they can borrow 
endogenously fluctuates as their state fluctuates, so that repaying the debt is always pre-
ferred to defaulting on it. This model is closely related to and builds on Zhang (1997), 
which studies limited enforcement under incomplete markets in a pure exchange econ-
omy with 2-type agents.  
5.1 The Model 
The model environment is the same as the bond with natural borrowing constraints 
model. Given the world interest rate R , the planner chooses consumption, capital and 
bonds holdings 
 






)}  to maximize the welfare specified as (2), 
subject to resource constraints specified as (10) and enforcement constraints given by 
1
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subject to the resource constraints in the closed economy, 
1 1
0 0 0 0( , ) ( , ) (1 ) ( , ) ( , )c a s k a s k a s a k a s




+ $ $ % . 
The enforcement constraints require that at any history node, the continuation utility must 
be greater than or equal to the autarky utility from that node on for any following state.  
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Formally, the planner’s problem, labeled as the original problem, is given by 
The original problem: 
0
0










0 0 0 0 0 0s.t. ( , ) ( , ) (1 ) ( , ) ( , ) ( , ) ( , )
t t t t t t
t




+ # # + = + , (12) 
      10 1 0( , , ) ( , ( , ))
t AUT t
t
U s a x V a k a s
+
+
! , 1 |t ta a+! ,                (13) 
      0( , )
t
b a s D! .         (14) 
The constraint (14) is the short-sale constraint, where the debt limit D  can be set low 
enough such that no countries will bind at this constraint with the presence of the en-
forcement constraints. This constraint is a necessary condition to rule out the Ponzi 
scheme, which does not violate the enforcement constraints.  
The debt limit D  can be explicitly specified in the spirit of the natural debt limit. If a 
country were binding at the debt limit, to ensure the non-negativity of consumption, the 
debt limit would have to satisfy the following constraints: 
1 1 1
0 0 0 0 0( , ) ( , ) ( ( , ) (1 ) ( , ) ( , )) /( 1)
t t t t t
t




= $ # + # # # . 
In order to set D  loose enough, we choose the minimum of the right hand side of ine-
quality, that is, 
 max max max min( (1 ) ) /( 1)D a k k k R
!
"= # + # # #  (15) 
When the debt level approaches this limit, the utility level approaches negative infinity 
since the consumption approaches to zero. In the original problem, for any feasible allo-
cation, the short sale constraint will never bind with the presence of the enforcement con-
straints, which require that the discounted utility along any feasible allocation at any date 
be no less than the autarky utility (which is finite). This property will be used in the later 
proof. From here on, we drop the country index 
0
s  for simplicity of notations. 
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The world resource clearing constraints are given by (4). Similarly, we can define the 
equilibrium of the bond with enforcement constraints model. The enforcement constraints 
make this model very hard to compute. Without any transformation, this model has no 
obvious recursive structure because future decisions regarding consumption enter the cur-
rent enforcement constraint. This makes the standard dynamic programming approach 
inapplicable. In the next subsection, we propose a tractable recursive technique to com-
pute the bond with enforcement constraints model. The key idea is to replace the en-
forcement constraints with endogenous borrowing constraints. 
From the debt-constrained literature, we know that the nature of the enforcement con-
straints is to define an endogenous debt limit based on the risk of the default. This has 
been illustrated by Alvarez and Jermann (2002) and Zhang (1997). Alvarez and Jermann 
(2002) study the enforcement constraints in a pure exchange economy with complete 
markets. Zhang (1997) studies the enforcement constraints also in a pure exchange econ-
omy but with incomplete markets. In a pure exchange economy, the autarky utility de-
pends only on the exogenous shocks and so the feasible set is convex, even in the pres-
ence of enforcement constraints. Thus, first order conditions are necessary and sufficient 
for the optimality. In a production economy, the autarky utility at each node is a function 
of both the realized productivity shock and the amount of the capital stock that a country 
possesses. Thus, the feasible set is not convex in the presence of enforcement constraints. 
We need to prove the validity of the approach and to compute the solutions without in-
voking first order conditions, which are conveniently used in Alvarez and Jermann’s and 
Zhang’s works.  
5.2 The Computational Method 
In this subsection we first construct a transformed problem, in which an endogenous 
debt limit function replaces the enforcement constraints in the original problem. The en-
dogenous debt limit function is carefully designed such that any solution to the trans-
formed problem is also a solution to the original problem, and vice versa. The trans-
formed problem has an obvious recursive structure and is much easier to compute. Thus, 




Construct the transformed problem 
The debt limit function :B A K! "R , where A  and K  denote the finite set of shock 
and capital stock, specifies the amount that a country can borrow if the productivity 
shock today is a !A  and the capital choice is !k "K . The key to constructing the trans-
formed problem is to find an endogenous debt limit function *( , )B a k!  such that any solu-
tion to the transformed problem is a solution to the original problem, and vice versa. Ob-
vious such debt limit functions are not unique.23 Here we provide a computationally con-
venient way to construct a candidate of such debt limit functions. Moreover, a useful 
property of the debt limit function we constructed is that it prevents default by prohibiting 
agents from issuing more debt than they are willing to repay, while allowing as much 
borrowing as possible.  
The debt limit function *B  is constructed from the following three steps. First, given 
any debt limit function ,B  we define the W  problem with B  as 
0 0 0
0
( ), ( ), ( )
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W a k b B a u c a! "
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=
= $$     (16) 
1 1 1s.t. ( ) ( ) (1 ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )t t t t t t
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+ # # + $ +  
        ( ) ( , ( ))t t
t
b a B a k a! , 
where, the function # #: A KW A K F F !! ! ! "R , with [ ,0]F D=  and D  defined as (15), 
denotes the optimal welfare given the debt limit function # #A KB F !"  and the initial state 
0 0 0( , , )a k b A K F! " " . Second, we define the operator 
# # # #
:
A K A K
T F F
! !
"  on the debt 
limit function as below:  
 
TB(a, !k ) " max
!a |# ( !a |a)>0
!b( !a ) :W ( !a , !k , !b( !a ); B) =V
AUT ( !a , !k ){ }   for all ( , )a k! . (17) 
                                                
23 Any debt limit function under which the feasible allocation set of the transformed problem is a subset of 
the feasible set of the original problem but includes the optimal solutions of the original problem is a 
candidate for the transformed problem. 
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=  with 0 ( , )B a k D! =  for all 
( , )a k! . We next discuss the validity of each step in details.  
We know that the W  problem with the debt limit B  is well defined and has a recur-
sive structure given by 
 
W (a,k,b; B) = max
c, !b , !k
u(c) + " # ( !a | a)W ( !a , !k , !b ; B)
!a |a
$            (18) 
s.t. (1 )c k b ak k Rb! "# #+ + $ + % +  
           ( , )b B a k! !" . 
For convenience of reference, we call W  the market utility, which is the maximum utility 
that a country with state (a,k,b)  can obtain from participating the credit market with debt 
limits B . The above recursive problem has the following useful properties, which help 
demonstrate validity of the operator T  on debt limit functions. 
Lemma 1. For fixed  (a,k, B) , ( , , ; )W a k b B  is continuous in b ; for fixed ( , , )a k b , 
( , , ; )W a k b B  is continuous in B . 
Lemma 2.  For fixed ( , , )a k B , ( , , ; )W a k b B  is strictly increasing in b . 
Lemma 3. Suppose that lim ( , , ; ) and lim ( , , ; )
b b
W a k b B W a k b B
!"# !#
= "# = # . There ex-
ists a unique b!  such that ( , , ; ) ( , )AUTW a k b B V a k=!  for fixed ( , , )a k B . 
Lemma 1 follows directly from the Maximum Theorem and Lemma 2 follows from 
the envelope theorem and the strict concavity of the utility function. These two lemmas 
establish two important properties of the market utility, i.e., continuity with respect to 
debts and debt limits and monotonicity on debt levels. The above two properties and the 
Intermediate Value theorem give rise to Lemma 3, which shows that there exists one 
unique level of debt (cutoff debt) to make countries indifferent between the market utility 
and the autarky utility.  
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From the above three lemmas, one can easily show that the operator T  in (17) is well 
defined. However, for TB  to be a debt limit function, we still need to show that it is non-
positive for any ( , )a k! . For any future realization of shock, consider the market utility 
with ( !a , !k , !b )  where !b  equals the debt level zero. Clearly the market utility must be as 
least as high as the autarky utility because staying in the markets allows countries to 
smooth future consumption. Thus, the cutoff debt level must be less than or equal to zero. 
Lemma 4.  If ( , ) 0B a k! "  for all ( , )a k! , ( , ) 0TB a k! "  for all ( , )a k! . 
For a country with the shock a  and the capital decision k! , the debt limit function 
( , )TB a k!  specifies the maximum amount debt that a country is willing to repay rather 
than defaulting independent of realized states next period. From the definition of TB , the 
following corollary follows immediately. 
Corollary.   ( , )b TB a k! !"  if and only if ( , , ; ) ( , )AUTW a k b B V a k! ! ! ! !"  for all a!  fol-
lowing a . 
In the lemma below, we show the monotonicity property of the debt limit functions 
operator. The proof is delegated to Appendix 4 and the basic arguments are as follows. 
Suppose that the debt limit function B
1
 is tighter than the debt limit function B
2
 every-
where. Obviously the market utility under B
1
 is lower or equal to the one under B
2
 eve-
rywhere. Since the autarky utility is independent of debt limits, the amount of debt, with 
which countries are indifferent between the market utility and the autarky utility under 
B
2
, makes countries default under B
1
. The cutoff debt level under B
1
 must be tighter 
than the cutoff level under B
2
 everywhere. This property will be used to prove existence 
of the limit function in step 3.  
Lemma 5.  For any two debt limit functions 
1
B  and 
2
B , if 1 2( , ) ( , )B a k B a k! !"  for all 
( , )a k! , then 1 2( , ) ( , )TB a k TB a k! !"  for all ( , )a k! . 
When starting with the debt limit function 0 ( , )B a k D! =  for all ( , )a k! , we know that 
1 0 0( , ) ( , ) ( , )B a k TB a k D B a k! ! != " =  for any ( , )a k!  by the discussion above (the short 
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sale constraint is not binding in the presence of enforcement constraints). Using the 
monotonicity property of the operator T , we have  
2
0 0 0 0( , ) ( , ) ( , ) .... ( , ) ...
n
B a k TB a k T B a k T B a k! ! ! !" " " " " , for all ( , )a k! . 
Fixing any ( , )a k! , we know that any monotone sequence 0{ ( , ),B a k! 0 ( , ),TB a k!  
2
0 ( , ),T B a k!  ....}  in the compact set [ ,0]D  converges to a limit in the compact set, which 
is denoted by *( , )B a k! , i.e., 
*
0( , ) lim ( , )
n
n
B a k T B a k
!"
# #=   for all ( , )a k! .     (19) 
Now we can define the transformed problem using the debt limit function *B . 
The transformed problem: 
*
0 0 0
( ), ( ), ( )
0
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1 1 1s.t. ( ) ( ) (1 ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )t t t t t t
t




+ # # + $ +  
             *( ) ( , ( ))t t
t
b a B a k a! .            
In the following theorem, we prove the key result, which shows that any allocation 
that is optimal in the transformed problem is also optimal in the original problem, and 
vice versa. 
Theorem 6.  Any allocation is optimal in the transformed problem defined above, 
where 0 ( , )B a k D! =  for all ( , )a k!  with D  defined as in (15), T  is defined as (17), and 
*
B  is defined as (19), if and only if it is optimal in the original problem. 
Here we only describe the strategy of the proof for the “only if ” part and the detailed 
proof refers to Appendix 4. Suppose that an allocation xT = {cT (at ),kT (at ),bT (at )}  is 
optimal in the transformed problem and we want to show that xT  is also optimal in the 
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original problem. It is easy to show that xT  is feasible in the original problem. The key is 
to prove the optimality of xT  in the original problem, which is achieved by contradiction.  
Suppose that an allocation xO = {cO (at ),kO (at ),bO (at )} , which is feasible in the original 
problem, dominates xT . If xO  is also feasible in the transformed problem, we arrive at a 
contradiction to the optimality of xT  in the transformed problem. The feasibility of xO  is 
obtained recursively. Clearly xO  is feasible in the W  problem with B
0
= D  everywhere. 




 because xO  satis-
fies the enforcement constraints in the original problem. Repeating the same arguments, 
we can show that xO  is feasible in the W  problem with any T nB
0
, and hence xO  is fea-







! , B* .  
The technique to construct the transformed problem also manifests the computational 
approach to solve the transformed problem. We start with the debt limit function 
B
0
(a, !k ) = "D , and solve the transformed problem given the debt limit function. Then 
we update the debt limit function according to the operator T . We repeat until the debt 
limit function converges. The detailed algorithm is described in Appendix 5. 
The endogenous debt limit function is plotted in Figure 7. The amount that countries 
can borrow is strictly increasing in the capital stock. For low levels of capital, countries 
are poor and the benefit of default (having debt written off) is large relative to the cost of 
default (losing international risk-sharing). When countries get richer, the benefit of de-
fault relative to cost of default goes down, so countries have less incentive to default. 
Thus, rich countries are allowed to borrow more than poor countries.  In Figure 8, we 
present the endogenous debt limit over output ratios as a function of the capital stock. 
The debt limit over output ratio is not strictly increasing in capital stocks due to the con-
cavity of the production function. On average, the debt limits are quite tight, about 20 
percent of output.  
5.3 Results 
In this subsection, we simulate the bond with enforcement constraints model and re-
port the simulation results. The simulation method is the same as the bond with natural 
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borrowing constraints model. The simulation results are reported in Table 6. The bond 
with enforcement constraints model generates a positive FH coefficient, 0.51, which is 
significantly different from zero and close to the FH coefficient in the data, 0.46. Thus 
the bond with enforcement constraints model can account for the cross-section Feldstein-
Horioka puzzle. 
The intuition of the result is as follows. Together with state-uncontingent bonds, en-
forcement constraints generate state-uncontingent debt limits. The state-uncontingent na-
ture of debt limits means that countries can only borrow up to the amount at which, under 
any realization of uncertainty in the next period, countries still prefer to repay. Thus, the 
bond with enforcement constraints model restricts the amount of international borrowing 
and lending and generates a current-account-over-GDP ratio of about 6 percent, similar to 
what is observed in the data.24 With such tight endogenous borrowing constraints, this 
model generates the positive FH coefficient close to the data.  
When compared with the natural borrowing constraints in the previous section, the 
endogenous borrowing constraints are much tighter, which is shown in Figure 9. This 
comes from the difference of enforcement mechanism of debt contracts. Under the natu-
ral borrowing constraints, there is complete enforcement and the implicit default penalty 
is infinitely costly. However, under the enforcement constraints, there is limited enforce-
ment and the explicit default penalty is the autarky utility, which is less costly. Hence, 
under enforcement constraints, countries have more incentives to default when there are 
lower penalties, and they are not allowed to borrow as much as when there are fewer in-
centives to default resulted from higher penalties. The implications on the size of interna-
tional borrowing and lending also help us understand and evaluate two distinctive ap-
proaches to sustainability of sovereign debts. Clearly the willingness of countries to repay 
matches international capital flows better than the abilities of countries to repay.  
In the bond with enforcement constraints model, there are two types of frictions: lim-
ited span of assets and limited enforcement of debt contracts. These two frictions are both 
important for accounting for the cross-section Feldstein-Horioka puzzle and either fric-
tion alone does not work. We have shown that limited span of assets alone, as in the bond 
                                                
24 See Table 7. 
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with natural borrowing constraints model25, allows substantial borrowing and lending 
among countries, and thus drives down the cross-country correlation between average 
savings and investment rates. We have also shown in the previous version of this paper 
that limited enforcement of debt contracts alone still allows considerable borrowing and 
lending with volatile productivity process and fails to account for the cross-section Feld-
stein-Horioka puzzle.26  
Thus, it is interaction between the two frictions above that help us generate capital 
flows close to the data and account for the cross-section Feldstein-Horioka puzzle. The 
key is that when combined with uncontingent bonds, enforcement constraints generate 
state-uncontingent debt limits, which guarantee that no matter which state is realized, 
countries have incentives to repay. With a volatile productivity process, the constraints 
become more binding rather than looser in the case of limited enforcement friction alone. 
6 Time-series Correlation between Savings and Investment 
The models studied in this paper are rich enough to look at both the time-series and 
the cross-section implications. One natural question is what are implications on time-
series correlation between savings and investment rates within countries of the models 
studied here. In this section, we will address this question. 
It is well known that, in standard international business cycle models, capital flows 
instantly to countries with higher rates of return. This feature exaggerates the volatility of 
investment relative to the data, and thus underestimates the correlation between invest-
ment and savings. To overcome these issues, usually capital adjustment costs are intro-
duced. Thus, when looking at the time-series correlation, we also impose capital adjust-
ment costs in the complete markets model and the bond with natural borrowing con-
straints model. Models with enforcement constraints do not need capital adjustment costs 
because enforcement constraints in nature hinder capital flows.  
Following the literature, we specify the capital adjustment cost as 
                                                
25 In the bond with natural borrowing constraints model, the percentage of countries binding at the borrow-
ing constraints is close to zero, 0.01. Thus, we can think of this model capturing the friction of limited 
span of assets.  
26 In Zhang (2005), we show that the complete with enforcement constraints model, with the limited en-
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where !  denotes the adjustment parameter and is calibrated to match the volatility of 













We find that all the models, with or without financial frictions, generate the positive time-
series correlation between savings and investment rates with almost no change in the 
cross-section regression coefficient, as shown in Table 8. Hence, this paper confirms the 
results in the time-series literature that the positive time-series correlation offers no in-
sight about financial frictions, and in fact is the result of highly persistent shocks.  
7 Conclusion 
In this paper, we take advantage of one of the strong regularities in the data – the 
positive cross-section correlation between average savings and investment rates – to in-
vestigate frictions in international financial markets. The paper makes several contribu-
tions. Firstly, we find that both the friction on the span of assets and the friction on debt 
contract enforcement are important for understanding savings and investment behaviors 
across countries. We also find that, closely related to the literature on sustainability of 
sovereign debts, the willingness of countries to repay captures the observed international 
capital flows better than the ability of countries to repay. Secondly, we have developed a 
tractable model of a world economy with a large number of countries that is a useful al-
ternative to the standard two-country models, especially for issues involving cross sec-
tions.27 Thirdly, at a technical level we have developed a tractable method to compute the 





                                                
27 Contemporaneously Castro (2004a and 2004b) also developed the same framework to study the cross-
country income distribution and development regularities related to capital accumulation. 
27
 
Appendix 1: Data Description 
Country sample 
There are a total of 68 countries with all relevant data series available for the whole 
period (1960-2000). We delete 11 countries, which have RGDP per capita in 1995 less 
than $1050 (about 4 percent of the US RGDP per capita in 1995). These countries are 
Burundi, the Dominican Republic, Ghana, Kenya, Lesotho, Malawi, Malta, Niger, 
Rwanda, Togo, and Zambia. 
The 57 countries remaining in the sample are Austria, Australia, Belgium, Cameroon, 
Canada, Chile, Columbia, Costa Rica, Côte d’lvoire, Cyprus, Denmark, Egypt, El Salva-
dor, Fiji, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Guatemala, Honduras, Israel, India, Iran, 
Ireland, Iceland, Italy, Jamaica, Japan, Korea, Malaysia, Mexico, Morocco, the Nether-
lands, New Zealand, Norway, Pakistan, Panama, Papua New Guinea, Paraguay, Peru, the 
Philippines, Portugal, Senegal, Singapore, South Africa, Spain, Sri Lanka, Sweden, Swit-
zerland, Thailand, Trinidad & Tobago, Tunisia, the United Kingdom, the United States, 
Uruguay, Venezuela, and Zimbabwe. 
Data source 
All of the following series are from the World Development Indicators 2004 for 
1960-2000: nominal GDP, nominal private consumption, nominal gross capital forma-
tion, real GDP, and real gross capital formation. Total employment data are from three 
different sources. For 24 OECD countries, employment data are from the OECD data-
bases. For the following 19 countries, we obtain employment data from national statis-
tics: Cameroon, Chile, Columbia, Costa Rica, Cyprus, Egypt, El Salvador, Fiji, Israel, 
India, Jamaica, Malaysia, Pakistan, the Philippines, Singapore, Thailand, Trinidad & To-
bago, Uruguay, and Venezuela. For the remaining 14 countries, employment data are 
supplemented by the Penn World Table29 using the following formula: 
real GDP per capita * population
Employment
real GDP per worker
=  . 
                                                




System of National Accounts 
Our result for 16 OECD countries in 1960-1974 is 0.68, which is different from 0.89 
in the original Feldstein-Horioka study due to changes of systems of national accounts 
(SNA). In the data source used by Feldstein and Horioka, National Accounts of OECD 
countries (1974), the 1953 SNA and the 1968 SNA are used for 16 OECD countries. In 
our data source, the World Development Indicators (2004), most countries use the 1993 
SNA. The adoption of the 1993 SNA involved a lot of changes, some of which were sim-
ply reclassifications of items between various components of GDP, but others involve 
adding new transactions or suppressing old ones. Among all the components of GDP, the 
largest overall revisions have affected gross fixed capital formation. The 1993 SNA has 
broadened the concept of investment to include several types of expenditure that were not 
formerly considered to be capital spending such as spending on computer software and 
expenditures on mineral exploration, entertainment, artistic works, etc. The above 
changes led to an upward revision of gross capital formation and also led to a decrease of 
the regression coefficient of investment rates on savings rates. 
Appendix 2: Estimation of the World Productivity Process 
In this appendix, we describe an EM algorithm used to obtain the maximum likeli-
hood estimates of parameters in the regime-switching process specified in (9). The log-
likelihood function is given by 
 














i}  is a vector containing all the observations on country i’s TFP; 
1,2,3{{ , , } , }µ ! "# # # #=$ = %  denotes the parameters to be estimated; !  denotes regime; 
N  denotes number of countries; T denotes number of periods; and  
 

























Due to the nonlinearity of the maximum likelihood function, we cannot solve the parame-
ters analytically. We use an EM algorithm, which is described below, to iteratively solve 





First, update the conditional probabilities of regimes in each period for each country us-
ing Bayesian rule. Next, given the conditional probabilities, compute 
n
! with the maxi-
mum log-likelihood method. Iterate the above procedures until ! converges. 
Appendix 3: Algorithm for the Bond with Natural Borrowing Constraints Model 
Given any interest rate R , the recursive problem is well defined and we can solve for 
decision rules ( , , )c a k b , ( , , ) and ( , , )k a k b b a k b! ! . The decision rules together with the 
transition matrix of the productivity shocks define a Markov transition function over the 
states : ( )Q A B K! ! !P(A)!B(K)!B(B) [0,1]! as follows: 
( | ) ( , , ) '( , , )
( , , , , , )
0a A
a a if k a k b K and b a k b B




" " # #$
= %
&
'  , (21) 
where, B(K), B(B) and P(A) be the Borel set of K , the Borel set of B  and the power set 
of A . 
Given the above transition function, we can define the operator T  on the space of 
probability measures ( ,A K B! " "  P(A) !B(K)!B(B)) as the following: 
( )( , , ) ( , , , , , ) ( , , )
a A k K b B
T A K B Q a k b A K B a k b! !
" " "
=###     (22) 
for all ( )A K B! ! " P(A) !B(K)!B(B). Note that the operator T  maps the set of meas-
urable function !  into itself. An invariant distribution *!  over the state space is defined 
as the fixed point of T . 
We start by guessing an interest rate R < 1 / !  and solve the recursive problem for the 
decision rules , ,c k b! !  to construct the transition function Q  as Equation (21). Next, com-
pute the invariant distribution *!  by iterating from an initial guess according to (22) until 
it converges. We then check if the excess demand of the bonds holdings is cleared. If not, 
increase the interest rate R  if 0b <  and decrease R  if 0b > . Repeat the above proce-
dures until the excess demand is sufficiently close to zero. 
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Appendix 4: Proofs 
Proof of Lemma 5: By the definition of the operator T , we have 
1 1 1 1
| ( | ) 0
( , ) max { ( ; ) : ( , , ( ; ); ) ( , )}AUT
a a a
TB a k b a B W a k b a B B V a k
!" " >
" " " " " " "= =! ! , 
2 2 2 2
| ( | ) 0
( , ) max { ( ; ) : ( , , ( ; ); ) ( , )}AUT
a a a
TB a k b a B W a k b a B B V a k
!" " >
" " " " " " "= =! ! .  
By 1 2( , ) ( , )B a k B a k! !"  for all ( , )a k! , we have 1 2( , , ; ) ( , , ; )W a k b B W a k b B!  for any 
( , , )a k b  since the feasible set under 
1
B  is a subset of the feasible set under 
2
B . This 
means that  
1 2( ; ) ( ; )b a B b a B! !"
! !  for all a!  following a  and for all ( , )a k! .  
Thus 1 2( , ) ( , )TB a k TB a k! !"  for all ( , )a k! .     Q.E.D. 
Proof of Theorem 6: “Only if” part of the theorem: 
First, we need to show that { ( ), ( ), ( )}T T t T t T tx c a k a b a=  is feasible in the original 
problem. The resource constraints are obviously satisfied. The short sale constraints are 
satisfied by monotonicity of the operator T . We need to show that the enforcement con-
straints are satisfied. From * 0( , ) ( , ) ( , )
n
n
B a k B a k T B a k! ! !" =  for any ( , )a k!  and all n , we 
have 
( ) ( , ( ))T t T t
n t
b a B a k a!  for all n . 




,kT (at ),bT (at ); B
n!1
) "V AUT (a
t+1




 following ta  for any n . 
From the continuity of W  on B  for fixed ( , , )a k b , we have 
*
1 1( , ( ), ( ); ) ( , ( ))
T t T t AUT T t
t t
W a k a b a B V a k a
+ +




 following ta . 
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Furthermore by the optimality of Tx  in the transformed problem, we have 
1 *
1( , ) ( , ( ), ( ); )
t T T t T t
t
U a x W a k a b a B
+
+




 following ta . 
From the above two inequalities, we have 
1
1( , ) ( , ( ))
t T AUT T t
t
U a x V a k a
+
+




 following ta . 
Thus the enforcement constraints are satisfied at each history node. 
Second, we need to show that Tx  is optimal in the original problem by contradiction.  
Assume there is another allocation Ox  which is feasible under the original problem and 
delivers higher welfare than Tx , i.e., 
0 0
( ) ( ( )) ( ) ( ( ))
t t
t t O t t t T t
t ta a
a u c a a u c a! " ! "
# #
= =
>$$ $$ .    (23) 
We establish the contradiction by showing that Ox  is feasible in the transformed 
problem. Obviously the resource constraints in the transformed problem are satisfied. We 
need to show *( ) ( , ( ))O t O t
t
b a B a k a! , which is proven by induction.  
Clearly, we have 0( ) ( , ( ))
O t O t
t
b a B a k a! ,  where 0( , )B a k D! =  for any ( , )a k! , by 
construction of D . Thus, Ox  is feasible under the problem with the debt limit 
0
B , and we 
have 
1
1 0( , ( ), ( ); ) ( , )
O t O t t O
t
W a k a b a B U a x
+
+




 following ta . 
By the feasibility of Ox  in the original problem, we also have 
1
1( , ) ( , ( ))
t O AUT O t
t
U a x V a k a
+
+




 following ta . 
From the above two inequalities, we conclude that 
1 0 1( , ( ), ( ); ) ( , ( ))
O t O t AUT O t
t t
W a k a b a B V a k a
+ +




 following ta . 
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Thus, 0( ) ( , ( ))
O t O t
t
b a TB a k a!  from the corollary. 
Repeating the above arguments, we have 0( ) ( , ( ))
O t n O t
t
b a T B a k a!  for all n . Thus, 
*( ) ( , ( ))O t O t
t
b a B a k a!  for any ta , with * 0( , ( )) lim ( , ( ))
O t n O t
t t
n
B a k a T B a k a
!"
= . So the al-
location Ox  is feasible in the transformed problem. 
From the optimality of Tx and feasibility of Ox  in the transformed problem, we have 
0 0
( ) ( ( )) ( ) ( ( ))
t t
t t T t t t O t
t ta a
a u c a a u c a! " ! "
# #
= =
>$$ $$ , 
which contradicts (23). Thus, the allocation Tx  is optimal in the original problem. 
The “if” part of the theorem can be proved using the similar arguments.       Q.E.D. 
Appendix 5: Algorithm for the Bond with Enforcement Constraints Model 
We compute solutions to the bond with enforcement constraints model by computing 
the transformed problem with endogenous borrowing constraints. We start with an initial 
guess of the world interest rate 1/R !< . Next, we guess the initial debt limit function 
0
B  
(start with very loose debt limits) and iterate over the debt limit functions as following. 
Given any debt limit function ( , )jB a k! , we solve the value function ( , , ; )jW a k b B  and 
policy functions { ( , , ), ( , , ), ( , , )}c a k b k a k b b a k b! ! . The new debt limit function is given by 
1
| ( | ) 0
ˆ ˆ( , ) max { : ( , , ; ) ( , )}AUTj j
a a a




" " " " "= = .    
We repeat the above procedures until the debt limit function converges. We compute the 
invariant distribution over the states and compute the excess demand in the bond markets. 
If the bond markets clear, we are done. Otherwise we update the interest rate R  and re-
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Table 1: The Cross-Section Regression Coefficients 














 Note: numbers in the bracket are standard errors of the coefficient above. 
Table 2: Summary of the Parameters 
Average TFP growth rate 
a
g  0.013 
Capital share in production !  0.33 
Capital depreciation rate !  0.06 
Risk aversion parameter !  2.00 
Discount rate !  0.96 
Table 3: Maximum Likelihood Estimation Results 
Regime Low Middle High 
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   Note: numbers in the bracket are standard errors of the coefficient above. 
                                                















Standard deviation of mean 0.021 
Standard deviation of standard deviation  0.003 











Standard deviation of mean 0.029 
Standard deviation of standard deviation  0.004 











Standard deviation of mean 0.104 





Table 7: Current Account over GDP Ratio 
Data 0.06 
Complete Markets 0.41 
Bond with Natural Borrowing Constraints 0.42 
Bond with Enforcement Constraints 0.06 
Note:  
(1) The current account over GDP ratio is defined as ratio of the absolute value of current account to 
GDP. 
(2) Statistics in the data and in the models are taken average over time and across countries in the sample.  
 
 
Table 8: The Time-Series Correlation 
Data 0.68 
The complete markets model 0.58 
The bond with natural borrowing constraints model 0.65 
The bond with enforcement constraints model 0.68 
 
Note: 
All statistics are calculated by averaging the time-series correlation between savings and investment rates 
across countries. 
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I/Y = 0.13  +  0.46 * S/Y
        (0.01)    (0.07)
R-square = 0.46  
Figure 1: The Cross-Section Feldstein-Horioka Regression
The regression sample: 57 countries over the period from 1960 to 2000.
Note:
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   Figure 3: Feature 1  
Figure 4: Feature 2  Figure 5: Feature 3
Note: TFP processes graphed here are logged and normalized.
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Figure 6: Natural Borrowing Constraints 
Note: GDP is output with mean productivity shock at any given capital stock.
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      Figure 7: Endogenous Borrowing Constraints, Level 
The Bond with Enforcement Constraints Model
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    Figure 8: Endogenous Borrowing Constraints, Ratio 
The Bond with Enforcement Constraints Model
Note: GDP is output with mean productivity shock at any given capital stock.
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Figure 9: Endogenous and Natural Borrowing Constraints
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